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HP he IPTS Report is produced on a monthly basis ­ ten issues a year to be precise, since there 
■*■ are no issues in January and August ­ by the Institute for Prospective Technological Studies 
(IPTS) of the Joint Research Centre QRC) of the European Commission. ΤΙκ IPTS formally 
collaborates in the production of the IPTS Report with a group of prestigious European institutions, 
forming with IPTS the European Science and Technology Observatory (ESTO). It also benefits from 
contributions from other colleagues in theJRC. 
The Report is produced simultaneously iti four languages (English) French, German and 
Spanish) by the IPTS. The fact that it is not only available in several languages, but also largely 
prepared and produced on the Internet's World Wide Web, makes it quite an uncommon 
undertaking. 
The Report publishes articles in numerous areas, maintaining a rough balance between them, 
and exploiting interdisciplinarity asfar as possible. Articles are deemed prospectively relevant if 
they attempt to explore issues not yet on the policymaker's agenda (but projected to be there sooner 
or later), or underappreciated aspects of issues already on the policymaker's agenda. The multi­
stage drafting and redrafting process, based on a series of interactive consultations with outside 
experts guarantees quality control. 
The first, and possibly most significant indicator, of success is that the Report is being read. The 
issue 00 (December 1995) had a print run of 2000 copies, in what seemed an optimistic 
projection at the time. Since then, readership of the paper and electronic versions has exceeded the 
50,000 mark. Feedback, requests for subscriptions, as well as contributions, have come from 
policymaking (but also academic and private sector) areles not only from various parts of 
Europe but also from the US, japan, Australia, Latin America, N. Africa, etc. 
We shall continue to endeavour to find the best way of fulfilling the expectations of our quite 
diverse readership, avoiding oversimplification, as well as encyclopaedic reviews and the 
inaccessibility of academic journals. The key is to remind ourselves, as well as the readers, that 
we cannot be all things to all people, that it is important to carve our niche and continue 
optimally exploring and exploiting it, hoping to illuminate topics under a new, revealing light for 
the benefit of the readers, in order to prepare them for managing the challenges ahead. 
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Cyber-Security Issues 
Bernard C l e m e n t , Lau ren t Bes lay and Duncan G i l s o n , IPTS 
C yber-security is a broad issue which is becoming increasingly important as com-puter networks become more widespread. It encompasses computer- and network-
related crime, privacy issues, trust and confidence, 
and dependability of critical infrastructures. At the 
level of individual Member States, European 
objectives for harmonization and integration, in 
conjunction with the eEurope project, have created 
the obligation to ensure access to pan-European 
infrastructure such as telecommunications, elec-
trical power systems, gas and oil storage and 
transportation, banking and finance, transporta-
tion, water supply systems, and emergency 
services. These critical infrastructures are increas-
ingly dependent on ICT infrastructures. In their 
drive for greater efficiency companies and organi-
zations are computerizing and networking their 
systems, thus making these systems increasingly 
vulnerable to attack. Moreover, the inexorable 
drive towards standardization and open platforms 
that characterizes systems in the civilian field 
increases their vulnerability in that a standardized 
system is an easier target to hit. One of the lines of 
research that has been identified is the need to 
take greater account of a range of infrastructure 
issues, and in particular critical infrastructures 
issues, in order to build a stronger partnership bet-
ween the public and private sector. Unlike the 
surveillance vs. privacy debate, this is an area 
where the interests of the public and private 
spheres coincide. 
Cyber-security is also an important issue for elec-
tronic commerce. The three main security-related 
barriers to the uptake of e-commerce by users have 
been identified as being: 1 ) the technological inade-
quacies in the hardware and software providing 
security; 2) the limited diffusion of secure processes; 
and, 3) the perception of insecurity (i.e. user trust and 
confidence). The main security threats to computer 
networks can be subdivided into those traditional 
criminal activities that have simply shifted to the 
Internet as an alternative channel, and those activi-
ties that specifically target the network. Clearly, over-
coming these problems will be a necessary part of 
the development of e-commerce and the informa-
tion society in general. For business, a major issue 
today is to create a model for identification (saying 
who you are) and authentication (proving you are 
who you say you are) that not only works reliably, 
but inspires sufficient trust in users and merchants 
alike to encourage their use of e-commerce. On the 
users' side, the information that businesses collect 
about their customers or visitors to their web sites is 
an area in which conflicts may arise between the 
interests of businesses wishing to target their 
products and services, and the desire of individuals 
to ensure their privacy and/or anonymity. 
Estimating the incidence, scale and cost of 
cybercrime represents one of the most important 
challenges lawmakers face when dealing with 
computer- and network-related crime. It is clearly 
essential to evaluate the scale and impact of 
© IPTS. No.57 - JRC - Seville. September 2001 
T h e IPTS R e p o r t 
cybercrime activity in order to define the types of 
measures to be taken and ensure their propor-
tionality. Measurement is subsequently necessary 
to assess the effectiveness of the measures taken. 
However, for a mixture of economic and psycho-
logical reasons cybercrime is probably greatly 
under-reported. Since it strikes at the heart of the 
notion of technological security, firms may well 
be reluctant to admit that apparently sophisticated 
measures designed to protect the interests of their 
customers have been unravelled with apparent 
ease by an errant teenager. Cyber attacks on bank 
accounts are likely to have a much greater direct 
impact on the customer than traditional bank rob-
beries and so be liable to undermine user confi-
dence. This sort of consideration is likely to influen-
ce banks' policy on security and on handling com-
plaints of irregularities. Although difficult, obtaining 
reliable statistics is essential if realistic cost-benefit 
assessment of the risks is to be made. 
Cybercrime: motive, opportunity 
and vulnerability 
Cybercrime, as in all crime, is made possible by 
the confluence of three factors: motive, opportunity 
and vulnerability. When the value is sufficient to 
incite motive, the influence of the two other factors 
depends specifically on the available technologies 
- in the case of cybercrime, on the availability of 
new information and communications technol-
ogies (ICTs). 
As has been predicted,1 an increasing propor-
tion of the activities of media, banking, and govern-
ment services have been digitized. This means that 
these activities are not only evolving into fully 
computerized processes but are becoming part of a 
fully interconnected network environment. Para-
doxically, it is this powerful technological com-
bination which represents a key point of weakness, 
as it has enabled the creation of a virtual world 
which provides both the opportunity and vulne-
rability necessary for cybercrime to prosper. The 
criminal fraternity will tend to shift its attention to 
the point where maximum value meets maximum 
vulnerability, thus as value increasingly moves onto 
digital networks, greater efforts will be needed to 
protect that value, one way or another, against the 
attentions of criminal elements. 
To some extent, the information revolution can 
be regarded as an outcome and logical continuation 
of the process of the digitization2 of economic 
activity. Thus, some aspects of electronic commerce 
will in part simply substitute for traditional com-
merce, and insofar as this is the case, cybercrime 
and cyber-criminals will partially replace traditional 
crime and traditional criminals, although perhaps 
with differing degrees of sophistication. In this sense, 
some aspects of cyber-criminality will be new, but 
others have a familiar ring to those involved in 
fighting crime. 
Another facet of the problem, however, adds to 
the emerging complexity. E-commerce may be 
attractive to businesses initially because it enables 
them to cut costs, increase efficiency and gain a 
temporary competitive advantage. But its real attrac-
tiveness lies in the long-term potential it has for 
transforming ways of doing business to an extent 
that adds new value to the economy. As the trans-
formation potential of e-commerce materializes, its 
substitutional effects diminish, and a new economy 
replaces the old. Since crime naturally targets sour-
ces of value, it is only to be expected that with 
the digitization of value comes the digitization of 
crime. New value creation, and the value itself 
(electronic cash is a simple example) thus consti-
tute the new target for criminal activity. 
Ironically, the emergence of "net crime" today 
may be seen a positive sign for E-Commerce as it 
demonstrates perhaps more effectively than any 
media hype that electronic business is generating 
economic value. 
3 
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The internet as vehicle or target 
The references made earlier to the substitutional 
and new effects of e-commerce are reflected in 
what we perceive as two fundamental categories of 
cybercrime: 
• traditional types of crime in which the Internet 
is merely a vehicle for criminal activity; 
• attacks against the network in which Internet 
itself becomes the target. 
Examples of the vehicle category include the 
unauthorized transfer of a bank balance, or the 
sale and distribution of child pornography. While 
these are crimes which have a bricks-and-mortar 
equivalent, there is no doubt that use of the 
Internet gives them a new scale and dimension. 
Examples of Internet as a target include the many 
instances where websites have been temporarily 
shut down as a result of cyber attacks (February 
2000, Yahoo, Ebay, etc.) using various means, 
including viruses. However, this is more cyber-van-
dalism than cyber-robbery, and it will be necessary 
to identify profitable cybercrime scenarios in areas 
where the Internet is the source and sink of value 
in e-commerce transactions. Clearly intellectual 
property, industrial espionage, misuse of personal 
information, etc. are all areas in which there are 
potential impacts. 
Law Enforcement in Cyberspace 
The global and trans-national character of the 
Internet, and the difficulties in providing effective 
protection, give some idea of cyber-criminals'thea-
tre of operations. The absence of frontiers, and the 
virtual guarantee of anonymity combine to provide 
new opportunities for disguise and new places of 
refuge for the wrongdoer. Among the complicating 
factors, that of national sovereignty is perhaps the 
most thorny. Cybercrime can easily be committed 
remotely from another part of the world where 
different jurisdictions and legal standards apply. 
Legal wrangles may arise as to the actual location 
of the crime if perpetrator and victim fal I under two 
different jurisdictions. Moreover, the investigative 
powers or capabilities of each of the countries may 
differ, making cases difficult to prosecute even with 
the full cooperation of the authorities in all the 
countries concerned. In many cases, the normal ins-
truments of policing and enforcement may no lon-
ger be adequate to uphold the law when faced with 
these challenges. The forces of law and order can 
no longer count on their traditional investigative 
capabilities, which are increasingly being rendered 
obsolete by the new technology. Such an absence 
of effective legal protection contributes to creating 
a favourable climate for cybercrime. As the recent 
Commission Communication on cybercrime states, 
"the speed, mobility and flexibility of computer 
crime challenge the existing rules of criminal pro-
cedural law"3 (for some recent directives and com-
munications see Box 1). 
Box 1. Computer and network security 
related directives and communications 
from the European Commission 
• Communication to the Council and the 
European Parliament entitled Creating 
a Safer Information Society by Improving 
the Security of Information Infrastructures 
and Combating Computer-related Crime, 
(COM(2000)890) 26/1/2001. 
• Communication from the Commission to 
the Council, the European Parliament, the 
European Economic and Social Committee 
and the Committee of the Regions: Network 
and Information Security: Proposal for a 
European Policy Approach (COM(2001) 
298) 06/06/2001. 
• Commission report entitled: e-EUROPE-
an Information Society for All' progress 
report for the Special European Council 
on Employment, Economic reforms and 
Social Cohesion: Lisbon 23rd and 24th 
March 2000 (COM (2000) 130). 
• Directive 2000/31/EC of the European 
Parliament and of the Council of 8 June 
2000 on certain legal aspects of information 
society services, in particular electronic 
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commerce, in the Internal Market 
("Directive on electronic commerce") 
• Directive 1999/93/EC of 13 December 
1999 Establishing a common framework 
for electronic signatures 
• Commission Communication on 
Ensuring security and trust in electronic 
communication, 8 October 1997, COM 
(1997) 503 final. 
• Directive 97/66/EC of the European 
Parliament and of the Council of 15 
December 1997 concerning the processing 
of personal data and the protection of 
privacy in the telecommunications sector 
• Directive 95/46/EC of the European 
Parliament and of the Council of 24 
October 1995 on the protection of 
individuals with regard to the 
processing of personal data and 
on the free movement of such data 
• Council Directive 91/308/EEC on prevention 
of the use of the financial system for 
the purpose of money laundering 
• Proposal for a directive on Distance 
selling of financial services COM 
(1999)385, July 1999. 
In addition to the above, the European 
Commission's JRC is engaged in raising 
awareness and promoting consensus on 
issues of mutual concern among a broad 
spectrum of interested parties across 
European and international borders. 
The discussions at the recent workshop 
on cybercrime focused on the technical 
and jurisdictional issues, as well as the 
broader political implications. 
The erosion of the constraints of time and dis-
tance caused by these new technologies therefore 
gives renewed emphasis to the problem of non-
harmonized legal environments. One clear exam-
ple is the problem of lawful interception of commu-
nications, both in terms of the capability and 
grounds for such interception. As the same Commi-
ssion Communication states, "New technologies 
make it essential that Member States work together 
if they are to maintain their capabilities for lawful 
interception of communications."4 
Skills shortages 
The need to protect networks and data from 
attack or misuse is leading to increased demand 
for people with the right skills and training. 
Today, a network administrator not only has to 
have operating system management skills, but 
also needs to know about viruses, cryptography, 
authentication processes, etc. At the same time, 
law enforcers not only need traditional crime 
investigation skills but they also need to know 
how to collect and preserve digital evidence 
relating to either cyber-crime or traditional 
offences. Clearly, the highly technical nature of 
cyber crime and fraud also underscores the need 
for a close partnership between public and pri-
vate sectors in defining and implementing train-
ing policies and programmes. 
These problems underline the importance of 
taking measures to ensure the proper education 
and training of law enforcement personnel in 
the use of advanced technologies. New "Cyber 
Police" will in future be skilled in the application 
and use of information and communication 
technologies, operating systems, electronic sur-
veillance methods and cryptography. The new 
skills will sit side-by-side with the more tradi-
tional policing capabilities of analysis, investi-
gative methods and familiarity with the practices 
and motives of cyber-criminals, all of which will 
continue to be required. 
However, the forensic processes involved in 
identifying and collecting evidence will be com-
pletely new, and so new training needs will be 
created. The scene of a cybercrime case may 
well be virtual, but its proof still constitutes a cri-
tical parameter for the success of an investi-
gation. Thus issues such as data recovery, data 
source identification, Internet traces, computer 
evidence, and the question of harmonization of 
forensic methods for consistency of approach 
will also arise. 
5 
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Law Enforcement and Privacy - Striking 
the Right Balance 
The dilemma described above needs to be 
resolved in a way which broadly meets the interests 
of both public and private sectors. Using infor-
mation and communication technologies to fight 
cybercrime can have some unfortunate side effects. 
While a climate of confidence in their use is essen-
tial for the development and growth of electronic 
commerce, technologies used for investigation and 
surveillance in order to protect citizens from crime 
may in fact threaten their privacy and human rights. 
The challenge for policymakers therefore is to 
effectively reduce cybercrime while preserving the 
rights of individuals to privacy in an increasingly 
interconnected network environment. Perhaps a 
form of the precautionary principle can be applied 
here. The construction of scenarios on the impact 
of cybercrime around such themes as electronic 
payment systems, ambient intelligence and ubi-
quitous computing could contribute to making the 
right technology and policy choices for the future. 
The expansion of the Internet in domestic and 
mobile networks, and the multiplication of the num-
ber of types and modes of connection, will make 
the individual the point of convergence of a whole 
gamut of networked services. Identification will 
become an essential and critical function for users 
as they move around within an intelligent networ-
ked environment. However, excessively "strong" 
identification raises privacy concerns. Thus policy-
makers will need to be alert to threats to individual 
privacy and balance the needs of law enforcers 
wishing to monitor and detect potentially criminal 
activity with the legitimate right of privacy citizens 
should be able to enjoy in a democratic society. 
Public and Private Sectors -
A New Relationship? 
The emergence of cybercrime also calls for a 
new look at the relationship between public 
authorities and the private sector. Perhaps the clea-
rest illustration of this is to be found in the area of 
cryptography. As the single most important privacy-
enhancing technology, cryptography imparts confi-
dentiality, integrity and authentication to all forms 
of electronic communication. In contrast to past 
practice, most of the R&D effort in this area now 
comes from the private sector. Nevertheless, since 
such systems can be used for illegal activities, pub-
lic authorities maintain an element of control over 
their use and distribution. This creates something of 
a dilemma, in that on the one hand, those pro-
moting the growth of e-commerce are calling for 
the widest possible application of cryptography to 
protect the integrity of electronic transactions, in 
pursuit of creating a climate of confidence in their 
use. On the other, law enforcement agencies must 
be in a position to gain access to communications 
when necessary in order to combat cybercrime. 
Moreover, the public sector is equally dependent 
on a climate of confidence to enable development 
of the electronic services it provides citizens, and 
which are equally vulnerable to cybercrime. A 
further illustration of the difficulty created by 
cryptography is the blurring of distinctions between 
protecting national security and protecting national 
economic interests. Rather than being considered 
strategic weapons of defence, as was the case in 
cold-war days, these brands of technology are now 
regarded as essential instruments for protecting 
commercial confidentiality in an increasing global 
competitive marketplace. 
Global Initiatives on Cybercrime 
Many international initiatives on cybercrime are 
already underway. From 22 to 24 May 2001 the 
C8 held a meeting in Tokyo (followed by several 
working group meetings) and reconfirmed the 
importance of the relationship between govern-
ments and the private sector for a coordinated res-
ponse to cybercrime. The OECD has opted for a 
more technology-based approach, with its May 
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1997 guidelines on cryptography policy.5 In April 
2000, the 41-member Council of Europe issued a 
draft International Convention on the fight against 
cybercrime, consisting of both technical and legal 
provisions. In the EU, the Council adopted a reso-
lution in 19956 (revised in 1998-99) aimed at 
harmonizing the rules on the legal interception of 
telecommunications. 
The Workshop (see Box 2) was particularly 
timely because it came in the wake of the adoption 
by the European Commission of its Communi-
cation on Creating a Safer Information Society by 
Improving the Security of Information Infrastruc-
tures and Combating Computer-related Crime. 
Later in June, with a communication from the 
Council, the European Commission sought to give 
further impetus to security initiatives for networks 
and information. It is worth noting that these initia-
tives generally address the current perception of 
the kinds of protective measures needed, based on 
the way new technologies are being applied today. 
It could be claimed that such a perspective is not 
sufficiently forward-looking, and that as technol-
ogy evolves to hitherto unknown levels of sophisti-
cation, there is a risk of today's approaches becom-
ing rapidly obsolescent, and thus ineffective. 
Box 2. Potential lines of research 
• The lack of accurate statistics. 
Detailed information on the extent of 
the phenomenon is needed. Statistics are 
essential both for the public sector, which 
has to define security policy and determine 
the extent to which the law is observed, 
and for the private sector, so it can include 
this risk when defining economic models. 
Research is needed in order to identify 
current obstacles to data gathering, to work 
out an operational system of anonymous 
collection of cybercrime statistics and to 
define their requirements. 
Best practice in forensic methods and 
quality control of digital evidence. Work 
is needed to define intangible evidence and 
set procedures for its collection. 
Standardization procedures, including 
methods for the anonymous reporting of 
crime statistics to compensate for the lack 
of statistics. 
Cybercrime prevention methods, 
including information, education and awa-
reness campaigns at all educational levels, 
for a detailed study of prevention measures. 
Risk assessment methodologies, 
essential for gaining greater understanding 
of how cybercrime operates. 
Universal definitions of cybercrime, 
to enable co-ordination and harmonization 
initiatives. 
Cybercrime impact assessments 
in national security, the digital economy 
and the safeguarding of essential civil 
infrastructure. 
The need to find a way of exchanging 
information among law enforcement 
authorities, industry and users. 
Understanding the impact of regulatory 
measures in this area (liability versus 
criminal law) The relationship between 
intention in legislation, treaty negotiation 
and the effect that it will have once finished, 
enacted, adopted, applied, and enforced. 
The security of end-user systems 
Legal liability of software manufacturers 
in the event of negligent supply of security 
services or products 
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Notes 
1. Being digital, Nicholas Negroponte, published by Alfred A. Knopf, Inc., New York, 1995. 
2. Digitisation in this sense means a combination of computerisation (already well-established, though now 
more cost-effective and powerful) and communications (now cheaper, faster, easier, popular). 
3. Communication on Creating a Safer Information Society by Improving the Security of Information Infra-
structures and Combating Computer-related Crime, European Commission, Brussels, to be adopted. 
4. Ibid. 
5. Guidelines for cryptography policy, OECD, 1997. 
6. Council Resolution of 17 January 1995 on the lawful interception of telecommunications (OJ C 329,4.11. 
1996, pp. 1-6). 
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Striking a Balance between Cyber-Crime 
Prevention and Privacy 
A n d r e a s P f i t z m a n n , Dresden University of Technology and 
M a r i t K ö h n t o p p , Independent Centre for Privacy Protection 
Issue: A balance between cyber-crime prevention and the desire to ensure privacy Is 
urgently needs to be struck. However, i t is unclear to what extent this is possible using 
either the ICTs (Information and Communications Technology) available today or likely to 
become available in the near future. 
Relevance: Privacy is a concern both for individuals and for democratic society as a 
whole, if people feel they are being spied upon, they will tend not t o express themselves 
freely or act according to their own interests. As well as privacy, security Is also a basic 
need for human beings, in a wor ld where cyber-crime Is becoming more prominent and 
its effects are increasingly serious, it is important to look for ways that prevent cyber-
crime as far as possible wi thout undermining the concept of privacy and security. 
Introduction 
T he volume of digital communication has increased in line with the spread of the Internet as a global network. Nearly all this communication is lawful, but computer net-
works and electronic information may also be used 
to commit criminal offences. The concept of cyber-
crime can be subdivided into two distinct areas: 
• ordinary crime which makes use of the commu-
nications networks, and 
• new forms of crime specific to computer net-
works. 
In this article we will focus on cyber-crime 
prevention rather than limiting our view to cyber-
crime prosecution. However, the methods used to 
enable prosecution may have a crime preventing 
effect. After stating some of the basic facts of ICT 
security, we discuss whether a balance can be 
struck between cyber-crime prevention and prose-
cution on the one hand and privacy on the other. 
To begin our discussion of whether this balance 
can be struck, it is necessary to first define the 
underlying assumptions of our argument. Realisti-
cally, we have to assume that only partial coope-
ration between states and only the partial coopera-
tion of industry will be possible. However, at the 
same time we have to accept that national borders 
will effectively be open to ICT, know how, and 
information (assuming world-wide trade and 
communication). 
Against this backdrop, we have to consider the 
(net) effects on individuals, the economy, and so-
% 1 
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ciety that may be anticipated from each proposed 
ensemble of legal regulations and their prospective 
influence on ICT development, deployment, ope-
ration, and use. 
In our search for a balance between the two 
conflicting aspects of this problem, we first have 
to look at today's ICT security technologies and at 
proposed cyber-crime prevention and prosecution 
methods. 
Currently available security 
technologies 
In order to help prevent cyber-crime, users 
should protect their computer systems and their 
data (including their transaction data and com-
munication trails) against attacks. When discuss-
ing security technologies there are a number of 
configurations of the parties involved that can be 
considered. 
The broadest arrangement is Multilateral Secu-
rity, which means providing security for all parties 
concerned, requiring from each party only minimal 
trust in the honesty of the other parties: 
• Each party has its particular protection goals. 
• Each party can formulate its protection goals. 
• Security conflicts are recognized and compro-
mises negotiated. 
• Each party can enforce its protection goals 
within the agreed compromise. 
In the same way as the enlightenment paved the 
way for alternatives to superstitious world views 
and authoritarian political systems, technology for 
multilateral security has the potential to free users 
of ICT systems from the lack of self-determination 
that results from their lack of security. 
Some of these technologies can unilaterally be 
employed by various parties. To use others, bilate-
ral cooperation is needed, e.g. the cooperation of 
both communication partners. For some, trilateral 
cooperation is required. One example is that of 
legally binding digital signatures, which not only 
require the cooperation of the (at least two) com-
municating parties, but additionally at least one 
trusted third party for the certification of public 
keys. For other technologies, multilateral coopera-
tion between a large number of independent par-
ties may even be necessary. We will use this dis-
tinction to structure a short overview of what is 
known about technology for (multilateral) security, 
providing pointers to the relevant literature 
(Pfitzmann, 2000). 
Unilateral Technologies 
Unilateral technologies are technologies that 
each party can decide upon for itself. Therefore, nei-
ther coordination nor negotiation is needed concer-
ning their use. Important unilateral technologies for 
multilateral security are: 
• Tools to help even inexperienced users to 
formulate all their protection goals, if necessary 
for each and every application or even each and 
every action (Pfitzmann, 98, and Wolf, 2000). 
• (Portable) devices which are secure for their 
users in order to bootstrap security. The devices 
need at least minimal physical protection com-
prising direct input/output with their users 
(Pfitzmann, 1999) and, if they are multipurpose, 
an operating system providing fine-grained 
access control and administration of rights for 
applications, adhering to the principle of least 
privilege. This is essential to limit the spread of 
Trojan horses, and can prevent computer 
viruses completely. 
• Encryption of local storage media to conceal 
and/or authenticate its contents. 
• Hiding of secret data in local multimedia con-
tents or in the local file system (Anderson, 
1998) using steganographic techniques, not 
only to conceal the contents of the secret data, 
but also its very existence. 
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• Watermarking or fingerprinting digital data using 
steganographic techniques to help prove author­
ship or copyright infringements. 
• Using only software whose source code is pu­
blished and well checked or the security of 
which is certified by a trustworthy third party 
having access to the complete source code and 
all tools used for code generation. The best 
technique is to combine both approaches with 
regard to as much of the software as possible. It 
is only by using at least one of these two 
approaches that you can be reasonably certain 
that the software you use does not contain 
Trojan horses. More or less the same applies to 
hardware where all sources and tools used for 
design and production are needed as well to 
check for the absence of Trojan horses. 
Bilateral Technologies 
Bilateral technologies can only be used if the 
communication partners cooperate. This means 
that some coordination and negotiation is needed 
concerning their use. 
Important bilateral technologies for multilateral 
security are: 
• Tools to negotiate bilateral protection goals and 
security mechanisms, (Pfitzmann, 1998). 
• Cryptographic mechanisms and steganographic 
mechanisms to secure the communication con­
tent (see Figs. 1 and 2). 
Trilateral Technologies 
Trilateral technologies can only be used if a 
third party is involved to fulfil a specific task for the 
other participating parties. This means that more 
coordination and negotiation is needed concerning 
their use compared with unilateral - and in most 
cases as well, bilateral - technologies. Important 
trilateral technologies for multilateral security are: 
• Tools to negotiate trilateral security mecha­
nisms, e.g. for accountability. 
• A public-key infrastructure (PKI) to provide 
users with certified public keys of other users 
to test their digital signatures and to give users 
the ability to revoke their own public key if 
the corresponding private key has been com­
promised. 
• Security gateways to bridge incompatibilities 
between security mechanisms or details. Se­
curity gateways work well for integrity and 
accountability mechanisms, but are of ques­
tionable value for confidentiality and anony­
mity mechanisms. Of course, security gate­
ways cannot bridge incompatibilities between 
protection goals. 
Figure 1. Cryptography to achieve confidentiality and 
integrity of communication contents 
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• Mechanisms to provide for digital pseudonyms, 
i.e. a suitable combination of anonymity and 
accountability (Chaum, 1981). In particular, 
there are mechanisms to securely transfer signa-
tures (expressing authorization, called creden-
tials) between different pseudonyms of the same 
party (Chaum, 1985,1990,1992). This is called 
transferring signatures between pseudonyms. 
When pseudonyms are used during accoun-
table value exchange, there are a number of possi-
bilities for the tasks of the integrated third party: 
• Identification of the user in event of fraud 
(pseudonyms are certified and the certification 
authority knows real identities), i.e. privacy of 
pseudonymous parties cannot be guaranteed. 
• Mandatory deposit of payment with an active 
trustee to prevent fraud in spite of completely 
anonymous pseudonyms, i.e. privacy of the 
pseudonymous parties can be guaranteed. 
Multilateral Technologies 
Multilateral technologies can only be used if a 
large number of independent parties cooperate. 
This means that coordination and possibly negotia-
tion are needed on a large scale. Important multi-
lateral technologies for multilateral security are: 
• Tools to negotiate multilateral protection goals 
and security mechanisms, e.g. for anonymity 
and unobservability. 
• Mechanisms to provide anonymity, unobser-
vability, and unlinkability with regard to 
• communications, i.e. protect who communica-
tes when to whom and from where to where 
(Chaum, 1981,1985, Pfitzmann, 1987, Cooper, 
1995, Federrath, 1996, Jerichow, 1998, Reiter, 
1999, Goldschlag, 1999) (See Fig. 3). 
• payments, i.e. protect who pays what amount 
to whom and when (Chaum, 1989, Asokan, 
1997) and 
• value exchange, i.e. protect electronic shop-
ping from observation (Bürk, 1990, Asokan, 
1997). 
All the above without compromising integrity, 
availability, or accountability. 
Evaluation of maturity and effectiveness 
Table 1 gives our evaluation of the maturity and 
effectiveness of the security technologies mentio-
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Figure 3. Anonymity, unobservability, and 
unlinkability for communication 
Functions of each MIX: 
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and outgoing messages 
MIXes can be used protect 
• e-mail and Web-access, 
e.g. Onion Routing, and 
• mobile communications 
Together, all MIXes used can 
provably trace messages 
ned in the previous sections. Their sequence in the 
table is mainly bottom-up, i.e. a technology for 
security placed in a particular row is required be-
fore a technology listed below can be effective. In 
some places, examples are given after a semicolon. 
As can be seen, the weakest link in the security 
chain today is the user device, in particular its 
physical protection and operating system. Much 
has to be done to improve both. 
Obviously, security evaluation of ICT and inte-
gration of security technologies are the challenges 
for research that have the greatest impact on ICT 
security. 
Approaches to preventing cybercrime 
and their side effects 
Many of the approaches to preventing or 
prosecuting cyber-crime that have been discussed 
implicitly or explicitly aim at reducing ICT security 
in order to enable access by law enforcement 
agencies. Most of these mechanisms are based on 
the implementation of backdoors and loopholes 
(STOA, 2000), e.g. by integrating Trojan Horses in 
operating systems or by requiring encryption sys-
tems with key escrow or key recovery. However, it 
is likely that such backdoors and loopholes will be 
used by criminals as well as by authorized law 
enforcement agencies (Abelson, 1998). Moreover, 
such an approach is likely to be an obstacle to 
international trade in ICTs as no country would be 
able to trust ICT imported from abroad because of 
the risk that its security has been deliberately 
compromised. 
Fundamental rights to privacy and anonymity 
-the default value in the offline world- run counter 
to the obligation upon the user to leave (authentic) 
data trails while using the Internet. On the other 
hand, demanding that providers log all traffic data 
and store it for a long time, not only jeopardizes 
privacy through the potential misuses of this infor-
mation, but is heavily disproportionate: Anybody 
can render these logs completely useless by using 
encryption or strong steganographic tools and me-
chanisms for anonymity hosted in countries out-of-
reach of domestic law enforcement, but well con-
nected to the Internet and therefore well within 
reach both for privacy-conscious citizens and 
criminals. The real threat to cyber-crime prevention 
o 13 
V* 
The weakest link in the 
security chain today is 
the user device, in 
particular its physical 
protection and 
operating system 
Fundamental rights to 
privacy and anonymity 
run counter to the 
obligation upon the user 
to leave (authentic) 
data trails while 
using the Internet 
© IPTS, No.57 - JRC - Seville. September 2001 
T h e I P T S R e p o r t 
if 
Measures which are 
perceived to involve 
spying indiscrimi-
nately on the public in 
the name of detecting 
criminal activities run 
the risk of creating 
solidarity between 
privacy-conscious 
citizens and 
potential criminals 
Table 1. Maturity and effectiveness of security technologies 
physical protection 
security evaluation 
of ICT 
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operating systems 
cryptography 
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public-key 
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public research 
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good 
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very good 
good 
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demonstrators 
and prototypes 
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bard to assess 
good 
good 
acceptable 
good 
acceptable 
good 
good 
acceptable 
poor 
available 
products 
hard to assess; 
Me-chip 
hard to assess 
poor; Windows NT 
Windows 2000, 
Linux, 
Mac OS X 
good; PGP 2.6.x 
poor 
hard to assess 
acceptable; 
Onion Routing, 
Freedom 
good; PGP 2.6.x 
poor 
products fielded 
on a large scale 
very poor; chipcards 
hard to assess 
very poor; Windows 98, 
Windows ME, 
Windows CE, 
Mac OS 9.x 
acceptable; PGP 5.x, 
PGP 6.x 
very poor 
poor; proxies 
acceptable; 
PGP 5.x, PGP 6.x 
very poor 
and prosecution is that such disproportionate 
measures tend to create solidarity between privacy 
conscious citizens and potential criminals. All 
experience with fighting organized crime shows 
that this kind of solidarity is one of the most serious 
obstacles to success. Phil Zimmermann stated this 
quite concisely: "If privacy is outlawed, only 
outlaws will have privacy" (see Note 1 ). Taking this 
approach to policing cyberspace may, therefore, 
prove counterproductive. 
As may be seen in Table 1, the state of public 
research into security technologies is quite advan-
ced in most cases. An effort is needed, however, to 
implement these technologies in standard products 
so as to enable all users of open networks to benefit 
from them. Less effort is required to protect com-
munication within a closed group of educated 
users. This means criminal organizations can create 
and use their own set of security tools as well as any 
other closed user group, thus making, restrictions 
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on cryptography easy to circumvent by precisely 
those groups whose activities they are intended to 
curtail ( Franz, 1996). 
From this viewpoint it seems to be logical to dis-
cuss active attacks by law enforcement agencies, 
e.g. denial-of-service attacks, unleashing viruses, or 
modifying content on computer hard disks of incri-
minated subjects (see Note 2, Walsh , 1996).These 
info-war techniques might effectively work accor-
ding to the saying "the end justifies the means", but 
such "licences to hack" are not only dubious from 
the legal point of view, but the authenticity of 
evidence investigated by attacks that manipulate 
data is highly doubtful as well. 
Thus, we have to be aware of the fact that cyber-
crime prevention is not only in tension with priva-
cy, but with ICT security as well: 
• Many tools needed to test security can also be 
used for hacking insecure systems. 
• It will be possible to use backdoors and loo-
pholes to manipulate traces (by either authori-
zed or unauthorized parties) as well as survei-
llance by authorized parties. 
On the other hand, security technologies 
provide the tools to prevent those types of cyber-
crime which are specific to computer networks: 
Public research and development in this area will 
lead to more secure systems enabling users to 
protect themselves. 
Conclusions 
To conclude, the current state of ICT security 
may be summed up as follows: 
• ICT security is generally extremely weak, and to 
try to improve it effectively is an ambitious 
undertaking. 
• All backdoors and loopholes installed on behalf 
of law-enforcement agencies will be quickly ex-
ploited by criminals i.e. these cyber-crime pro-
secution technologies are, therefore, cyber-crime 
enabling technologies. 
• Whatever steps are taken, astute criminals will 
come up with effective techniques to conceal 
• what they store and what and with whom they 
communicate from where to where, or even 
• whether they store and communicate at all. 
Thus, if legal restrictions are placed on the pri-
vacy permitted by ICT, only criminals will enjoy 
unrestricted privacy. 
In particular, it is crucial to ensure that efforts to 
combat cyber-crime must not slow the improvement 
of ICT security or weaken it even further (See note 3). 
In the current situation, law enforcement agencies 
should only be allowed and enabled to exploit 
security weaknesses of ICTs still present under tightly 
controlled circumstances. They should not be per-
mitted to force the implementation of additional 
weaknesses. 
In the long run, the security weaknesses of ICT 
should diminish and all users should be empowe-
red to decide on their own level of security and 
privacy. Law enforcement agencies should use 
technologies which allow effective supervision of 
individuals and small groups, but which do not 
scale to allow mass surveillance of those who do 
not protect themselves adequately. These techno-
logies for individual surveillance lie outside the 
ICT infrastructures. Mass surveillance may seem 
the easiest option for law enforcers, but what is 
important is to implement what is effective and 
not what is easiest. Moreover, democracy cannot 
be protected by building an Orwellian ICT 
infrastructure. 
All the same, we need an open discussion about 
cyber-crime prevention and prosecution in which 
law enforcement agencies, privacy pressure groups, 
the ICT industry, users and politicians take part befo-
re regulating the topic. 
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Looking for a balance, we may conclude that 
there is no way to achieve effective surveillance or 
curtailment of criminal activities by weakening ICT 
security. Instead, security tools have to be improved 
in order to provide better protection for users, i.e. to 
protect them against cyber­crime. At all events, tech­
nology alone cannot prevent all kinds of criminal 
action. There is a need for policy action instead of 
calls for police action (see note 4). We have to keep 
in mind that it is not just a matter of coping with 
potential economic losses, which we might even be 
insured against. Instead, we want to defend our de­
mocratic society in its entirety against damage. Thus, 
privacy and security must not be put at stake. ) 
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Crime and Abuse in e-Business 
Nei l M i t c h i s o n and Rob in Ur ry , Institute for Protection and Security 
of the Citizen (IPSO, JRC 
Issue: The criminal or abusive misuse of information and communications technology Is 
a problem of growing significance in the information society. E-Business, in particular, 
will require user confidence If it is to grow. 
Relevance: Common reporting procedures for computer crime incidents and standards 
of evidence are an important part of the response to cyber-crime. Policy initiatives in this 
area, however, need to be flexible enough to respond to the rapid evolution of both ICT 
technology and its exploitation by criminal elements. 
The importance of cyber-crime 
F ew who work in the field of electronic communications and transactions are in any doubt as to the importance of cyber-crime. Combating computer-based crime - in 
particular that internal to a company- has long 
been a concern of developers, implementers and 
administrators of computer systems, especially in 
the financial sector; although it sometimes seems as 
if the world of politics and the media has only just 
become aware of the possibilities of cyber-crime, 
and is now insisting on an instant, and totally 
effective, response. The vulnerabilities which have 
led to this awareness are real enough: among them 
is the very nature of e-business, which requires th* 
automation of various types of security procedures 
and "reality checks"; the ease with which a vulne-
rability, once identified, can be exploited from 
anywhere in the world; and the sheer quantity of 
traffic over the Internet, which makes any sort of 
monitoring difficult. Some new tools have had to 
be developed to cope with these specific vulne-
rabilities; but many computer security procedures 
and standards had already been developed long 
before the Internet arrived. 
It is extremely difficult to put hard figures on the 
incidence of cyber-crime, whether Internet-based 
or more "traditional", but it certainly exists: many 
different types of incident and attack have been 
identified, and some users have reported very large 
numbers of attempted intrusions, sometimes suc-
cessful. There is a widespread belief among those 
dealing with the subject that cyber-crime is subs-
tantially under-reported, whether through ignoran-
ce, lack of faith in response measures, or a desire to 
avoid bad publicity. 
Whatever the incidence of cyber-crime, there is 
little doubt about the widespread vulnerabilities; 
and it is reasonable to suggest that public policy 
should encourage protection and countermeasures 
without waiting for proof that these vulnerabilities 
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are being widely exploited. Indeed, the experien-
ce of law enforcement in other areas has shown 
that where there are opportunities for crime, crimi-
nals soon arrive to exploit them. 
A further consequence of cyber-crime -or per-
haps more specifically, of the perception of cyber-
crime- is its effect on confidence. Again hard figures 
are difficult to obtain, but it appears that lack of 
confidence in protection and response measures 
against cyber-crime is a significant brake on the de-
velopment of electronic business, particular "B2C" 
or "Business to Consumer" transactions. Before a 
consumer starts electronic commerce, he will have 
some "confidence requirements". These might 
include: 
• that the business is honest 
• that the business is financially sound 
• that redress in the case of dispute is a practical 
option 
• that there is reasonable protection against crimi-
nals intervening in the transaction. 
Various mechanisms are under development to 
help consumers to acquire this confidence in 
appropriate cases (see http://econfidence.jrc.it/), 
but there is still much to be done. Recent incidents 
have attracted much media attention, and this has 
certainly had the positive effect of alerting system 
developers and e-commerce providers to the vul-
nerabilities of their systems; but in the absence of 
reliable figures on cyber-crime it is hard to evaluate 
the effect of media attention on the general public's 
perception. Thus, although it may have corrected 
over-confidence, it may also have led to excessive 
caution. 
Taxonomy 
One of the first questions to be addressed is the 
definition and classification of "cyber-crime". This 
can be interpreted as meaning any criminal or abu-
sive activity involving computers, but that defini-
tion is too wide to be of use technically. The first 
and most fundamental distinction is that between 
using a computer as a tool in a crime and the com-
puter system (or its data) being the target of the 
crime. The focus here is on the latter1. 
When we come to ask which activities should 
be considered, it is clearly unsatisfactory to use a 
definition based on criminal or civil law; these 
differ from one jurisdiction to another, are in rapid 
evolution in several countries, and leave conside-
rable "grey areas" as to what is or is not covered in 
the event of activities spanning several jurisdic-
tions. Therefore, the definition used here is based 
on what administrators and users of computer 
systems find unacceptable rather than any strictly 
legal definition. 
Of course the failure to use a legal definition 
could lead to problems, in particular not knowing 
whether a particular activity is or is not covered. 
However, from a technical point of view the legal 
status of a particular abusive activity is usually of 
minor interest; what is important is to know what is 
going on, and detect and stop what is unaccep-
table. The exception perhaps comes in the area of 
the reaction to incidents, where the possibility of 
legal proceedings may constrain severely the 
process of gathering evidence; in that case it may 
be appropriate to take quite different actions 
against "antisocial" activities and "criminal" ones. 
If the external boundaries of the domain 
covered are somewhat fuzzy, the same is true for 
some of its internal distinctions. Various taxono-
mies have been proposed for cyber-crime inci-
dents, but we found none of them to be fully 
convincing and comprehensive2. There are three 
fundamental approaches to such a taxonomy: one 
based on the technical actions carried out, the 
second based on the intent of the perpetrator, and 
the third based on the effects (real or hypothetical) 
of the actions. But none of these is fully defined, 
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The three main 
approaches to a 
taxonomy of cyber-
crime are based on the 
technical actions 
carried out, the intent 
of the perpetrator, and 
the effects of the actions 
Security needs to be 
understood as a process 
not a product. Software 
tools are not enough in 
themselves, but need 
correct installation and 
use, and continuous 
monitoring 
nor fully satisfactory. Thus if we use the technical 
taxonomy of actions for the top level, we would 
want to distinguish between: 
• gaining access to data 
• modifying data 
• attacking computer functioning 
• attacking network functioning 
However, this top-level distinction groups 
together very different activities. "Gaining access to 
data" means different things if the data concerned 
represents: 
• the root administrator's password 
• a file of credit card numbers 
• a pop song 
Moreover, an individual incident is likely to 
involve more than one of these activities - having 
found the root administrator's password, what is 
the cracker going to do next? 
Similarly, however important the attacker's 
intent may be in legal proceedings, it does not yield 
a satisfactory basis for a technical classification of 
cyber-crime incidents: it is often not known at the 
time of an incident, and can only be established 
with the aid of external information. Distinguishing 
by the effects -real or hypothetical- of the actions 
is tempting in some instances, and is indeed 
standard industry practice. However it leaves a lot 
to be desired as a formal analytic tool, in particular 
because the possible effects of any sort of 
"cracking" attack are almost unlimited. 
Although a fully developed taxonomy does not 
appear to be within reach at present, it is possible 
to identify the five main areas of concern listed 
below: 
• Fraudulent transactions in e-business (whether 
from provider or client) 
• Identity theft and "passing off" 
• Credit card number and similar thefts (can be 
seen as a form of identity theft) 
• Theft of IPR 
• Denial of service and internet attacks. 
Prevention and Detection 
In the areas of prevention and detection of 
cyber-crime, there is a wide range of commercially 
available software products, as well as some more 
specialised toolkits for particular markets3. 
Two areas stand out as needing further atten-
tion. Firstly "security is a process not a product": 
software tools are not enough in themselves, they 
must be correctly installed and used, and conti-
nuous monitoring is essential. Secondly -and this is 
of course related to the first point- there is still a 
widespread need for training concerning aware-
ness and basic precautions (among staff and 
clients), the selection and use of particular 
prevention tools, and whether and when to call in 
expert help. 
In some countries and industry sectors across 
Europe, a market appears to be developing for 
centralized monitoring services to help detect 
cyber-crime in real time. Monitoring transactions to 
detect cyber crime requires specialist staff and 
equipment, and only the very largest companies 
are likely to have the resources to carry this out 
effectively in-house. Many of the large business 
consultancies now offer computer forensic services 
to their clients for internal security and incident 
investigation. 
The growth of CERTs (Computer Emergency 
Response Teams) over the last few years has added 
significantly to the armoury available to deal with 
cyber-crime incidents. However the provision of 
CERT facilities is still fragmentary, apparently at 
least in part owing to a lack of awareness among 
potential clients. The European Commission has 
recently called for a strengthening of the CERTs and 
improving cooperation among them4. 
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Response 
When an incident has happened, there are two 
-sometimes conflicting- needs: the integrity of the 
system has to be restored, and the incident has to 
be investigated5. This means collecting, preserving, 
organizing, and subsequently presenting the evi-
dence of what happened. If this evidence is to be 
presented to the system administrators to help them 
protect their system better, a very informal 
approach may be acceptable; but as soon as there 
is any possibility of the investigation going further, 
it is necessary to ensure that the evidence produced 
meets the requirements of the authorities involved. 
These authorities could range from internal com-
pany disciplinary procedures, through mediation 
and out-of-court settlement, to civil or criminal 
courts. Each of these bodies may have its own rules 
on the admissibility of evidence, and it is important 
that initial investigations of suspected incidents do 
not contaminate the electronic evidence so that it 
cannot be used. 
There are many "forensic" tools available on the 
market for investigation of computer incidents. With 
the aid of these, log files can be studied and 
interrogated; deleted and discarded data can be 
salvaged; the crucial points in a complex system 
can be identified; and the events which occurred in 
the incident can be reconstructed. Some of these 
tools also help in the construction of a coherent 
chain of evidence. However, there is need for fur-
ther work to produce an overall methodology to 
ensure that the chain of evidence is fully guaran-
teed; and even when that is available, it will have to 
be integrated with the target system. Ultimately, the 
aim must be not merely to be able to demonstrate 
"this was the state of the computer system and data 
when we started investigations", but "this is the 
proof of what had happened previously". 
If such an investigation goes to court -especially 
a criminal court with its high standards of proof- in 
order to fully satisfy the court of the accuracy of the 
statements made, it may be necessary to produce 
source files for the forensic tools used, and even for 
the operating system and software. This is a chal-
lenge which the industry has not fully faced up to 
yet, and it may be that over time this requirement 
leads to much more widespread use of open sour-
ce software, not just for computer forensic tools, 
but also for e-business applications and servers 
running them. 
Standards 
The question of European or worldwide stan-
dards often comes up in this context, but two par-
ticular areas stand out: reporting procedures and 
evidence analysis standards. 
It is simply not possible today to determine 
precisely the incidence of cyber-crime. Figures can 
be collected here and there, but it is not clear what 
they mean and how one can be compared with 
another. The only figures which have some element 
of comparability are figures for financial losses 
(always assuming (a) that the companies concerned 
know how much they have lost, and (b) that they 
report it truthfully). While common reporting 
procedures for computer crime incidents would not 
resolve all the difficulties of data - in particular the 
problem of under-reporting - they could at least 
give some sort of basis for comparing one sector, 
one country, one time, or one activity with another. 
The US model is potentially instructive; it com-
prises an Internet Fraud Complaints Centre and a 
National White Collar Crime Centre which provide 
useful clearing-houses for incident reporting, there-
by offering a certain amount of consistency across 
different sectors and different types of incident. 
As for evidence analysis standards, there is a 
need for the development, in parallel with inte-
grated evidence collecting systems, of agreed stan-
dards for the collection and analysis of log data and 
other similar files. These standards should ensure 
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After an incident has 
taken place, the need to 
restore the system 
quickly may conflict 
with the need to collect, 
preserve and organize 
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required in criminal 
proceedings 
Common reporting 
procedures would 
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the difficulties of data, 
such as under-
reporting, but tiiey 
would give some sort of 
basis for comparing 
countries, sectors, 
or activities, etc. 
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that the investigators also respect the requirements 
of European Data Protection laws, to protect the 
privacy of innocent parties during investigations. In 
the absence of a well-defined approach respecting 
data protection and privacy, then either incidents 
will not be investigated or innocent parties' right to 
privacy will be violated. 
Conclusions 
At the end of 2000,1PSC staff, along with a team 
from other European research organizations, laun-
ched a study on the fight against criminal and 
abusive activities ("cyber-crime") affecting e-busi-
ness. The study aims at establishing a technical 
"state of the art", in other words to define the 
present situation and expected evolution of tools 
and procedures to combat cyber-crime. The study 
group identified three principal technical areas of 
concern: the prevention of cyber-crime, the detec-
tion of cyber-crime, and response to incidents of 
cyber-crime. However it soon became clear that ä 
further area had to be addressed, namely the 
development of standards. 
At the time of writing ()une 2001), the study's 
report is still in draft form. The preliminary work 
of the study group has highlighted areas where 
further work is needed on the technical aspects of 
the prevention, detection, and response to cyber-
crime. This is not all; policy initiatives, in terms of 
both legal and administrative actions, are also 
needed, and are indeed under way in many coun-
tries of the European Union and at EU level. 
However, these policy initiatives will take time, 
and the world of computers -and of crimi-
nals-moves fast. There is a lot that can be done 
by the developers, providers, and users of e-
commerce systems to provide better protection 
against cyber-crime. ___F 
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Notes 
1. This is not to exclude the possibility of some "spill-over", in particular in the domain of response and 
evidence gathering: a reliable system for gathering and preserving electronic evidence could be useful in 
investigating and judging many sorts of crime which use computers as a tool. 
2. The only well-developed international effort at a legally-defined taxonomy is the Council of Europe's 
draft convention on cyber-crime - see http://conventions.coe.int/treaty/EN/projets/cybercrime25.htm for 
the 25 tn draft. However that is deliberately limited in its scope. 
3. The study group is evaluating the core toolkits against a general threat analysis, with a view to developing 
a common security model. This work is ongoing. 
4. http://europa.eu.int/information_society/eeurope/news_library/pdf_files/netsec_en.pdf 
5. There is some suggestion that a further reason for the under-reporting of cyber-crime incidents is that 
commercial pressure to get the system running again takes priority over incident investigation. 
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The Fight against Cyber-Crime: The Need 
for Special Training on Digital Evidence 
Eric F r e y s s i n e t , Gendarmerie Nationale, France 
issue: Combating cyber-crime is one of the greatest challenges facing society today, and 
efforts to tackle it involve law enforcement authorities, Industry and the public. The 
dangers at stake have been widely pointed out by the media, and underlined in recent 
official statements, such as the European Commission communication of 2000 on a safer 
information society - COM (2000) 890. Digital evidence is key to the detection and 
prosecution of the perpetrators of both cyber crime and an increasing port ion of other 
categories of crime. 
Relevance: Computers, the Internet and a wide variety of digital devices have now 
become a familiar part of citizens' everyday lives. They are also familiar to criminals. 
Fighting crime today means taking into account all possible sources of information or 
evidence, and this increasingly includes digital evidence. When f ight ing high-technology 
crime this kind of evidence Is even more necessary. Law enforcement authorities, 
lawyers and judges need to become familiar wi th these new tools, which means proper 
training is necessary at all levels. 
Introduction 
R ecently, the issue of training in the use and gathering of digital evidence' has been raised forcibly at the highest levels. Thus, in their Moscow Communiqué of Decem-
ber 10 tn 1997, the Justice and Interior Ministers of 
the G8 countries declared "III. Law enforcement 
personnel must be trained and equipped to address 
high-tech crimes", as the Third Principle of com-
bating high-tech crime. 
The emphasis placed on this need arises out of 
a realization that high-tech crime, or information 
technology crime, poses a very serious threat to 
our economies and the everyday lives of our 
citizens. More recently, the IOCE (International 
Organization on Computer Evidence) has put for-
ward a number of principles guiding the manage-
ment of digital evidence and procedures to be 
followed when using it. The third of these reads: 
"When it is necessary for a person to access ori-
ginal digital evidence, that person should be trai-
ned for the purpose. " 
There are a number of reasons for this wide-
spread concern. Firstly, information technologies 
now pervade all aspects of society. Digital telepho-
nes, computers, the Internet or on-board guidance 
systems for cars are no longer toys for a privileged 
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Where α crime occurs in 
one country, and both 
the victim and the 
suspect live in other 
countries, it is essential 
that the same level of 
expertise is reached in 
all the jurisdictions 
involved in order for 
digital evidence to be 
exchanged effectively 
Every police officer 
knows that when 
arriving on a crime 
scene it is his res­
ponsibility as a first 
responder to do his best 
to preserve the evidence. 
However, at present the 
police are often una­
ware of the value of 
digital evidence or 
the way in which it 
should be handled 
few or for technology buffs. Secondly, these new 
tools manipulate information, and this information 
can be useful in any investigation, whether it be 
specific to crimes against computers or digital devi­
ces, or simply involving them. Thirdly, because it is 
important for the proper functioning of our legal 
system, and to protect the rights of all parties, to 
deal with digital evidence with the same care as 
any other piece of potential evidence. Finally, in a 
networked environment, where a crime occurs in 
one country, and both the victim and the suspect 
live in other countries, it is essential that the same 
level of expertise is reached in all those jurisdic­
tions to ensure investigation data or digital eviden­
ce can be exchanged effectively when necessary. 
Training all the actors at all levels 
There are difficulties at all levels when dealing 
with digital evidence. Incorrect handling of a com­
puter, for example, may alter potential evidence. 
Managing a police operation inadequately might 
lead to ineffective use of the available digital eviden­
ce. And, a failure to understand the value of digital 
evidence might also mislead the decisions of a jury. 
Thus, all the actors involved need proper training. 
Nowadays, every police officer knows that 
when arriving on a crime scene it is his responsi­
bility as a first responder to do his best to preserve 
the evidence, as well as to help the victims and 
identify possible witnesses. At present, the police 
are often unaware of the value of digital evidence 
or the way in which it should be handled. Simple 
techniques for first responders have been identified. 
Various guides are being developed by different 
police agencies in the world, Interpol working 
parties (http://www.interpol.int/) and the IOCE 
(http://www.ioce.org/). These need to be exchan­
ged, promoted and distributed. 
Once collected, material holding digital eviden­
ce is passed on to a specialized investigator, who 
might want to have quick access to the information 
stored to assess its value to the investigation. Work­
ing in laboratory conditions takes a certain amount 
of time and might be inappropriate to the needs of 
the investigation if speed is of the essence. In some 
cases it is possible to read information stored on 
digital media using simple means without altering 
the original evidence. It is also important that the 
investigator understands quickly the potential 
usefulness of digital information to his inves­
tigation so as to be able to decide whether it is 
necessary to call in experts. Making decisions of 
this kind calls for a certain degree of understanding 
of the subject, thus creating a need for the relevant 
training. To this end, guidelines have been devel­
oped, and training packages are being set up by 
groups of specialists. They should be used and 
implemented at national level. 
Obviously, forensic laboratory specialists need to 
be properly equipped and trained. In particular this 
training needs to be regularly updated to keep up 
with rapidly changing technology. Working groups 
of specialists have been set up worldwide to study 
this issue. For instance in Europe within ENFSI (Euro­
pean Network of Forensic Science Institutes) and its 
FIT working group (http://www.enfsi.org/). 
Eventually, the evidence has to be explained to a 
judge or a prosecutor. For example, IP addresses or 
dates of file accesses are details that will be addres­
sed in a police or forensic laboratory report. Judges 
and lawyers must understand the significance of the 
information and the meaning of the technical details 
to be able to judge or present the case fairly. Howe­
ver, it would not be realistic to expect legal spe­
cialists to also become experts in IT, so proper trai­
ning must be devised for those people who do not 
have a technical background but need to make 
decisions based on technical information. 
The issue is similar for law enforcement deci­
sion­makers. They need to understand the specifi­
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cities of digital evidence so as to be in a position to 
provide their people with the proper training and 
tools, and to take the operational decisions appro-
priate to their area of competence. This could mean, 
for instance, organizing the storage of dozens of 
computers seized during a large police operation. 
These training needs exist in all countries and 
are particularly important when a number of diffe-
rent countries are involved in a criminal case. 
Where criminal investigations cross borders it is 
necessary for the evidence collected in one country 
to be legally recognized and properly interpreted in 
the country where the crime is prosecuted. Clearly, 
international standards are needed if this is to be 
achieved. 
New tools for training 
A wide range of training needs have been 
identified. These needs should be addressed in law 
enforcement or justice academies, which should be 
appropriately equipped with computerized training 
rooms. But the people in place also need to receive 
training and information and sending everybody 
back to the classroom might not always be the best 
solution. Moreover, this field is a quickly evolving 
one, making frequent updates essential. Simple 
guidelines need to be provided, and new types of 
training tools should also be considered. 
When looking for information about new 
technologies, the first place to go is of course the 
Internet. Using the powerful resources of search 
engines to search for general documents, guides for 
beginners or precise technical white-papers should 
be everybody's first reaction. Internet services and 
facilities should be made readily available for tech-
nical experts, investigators, managers and judges. 
To distribute modern training material, CD-
ROMs or DVD-ROMs will progressively replace 
books or video-tapes. CD-ROMs are a lot less 
expensive to produce, easier to transport and 
distribute, and can contain a large amount of infor-
mation. An international training CD-ROM for first 
responders will be launched this year, coordinated 
by Interpol and funded by a private sector initiative. 
But, when on a crime scene, the investigator will 
still need a compact checklist, and traditional pen 
and paper may often be the most appropriate 
solution, even if the more up-to-date investigators 
may wish to download those checklists onto their 
PDAs (personal digital assistants). 
Digital training tools could be more interactive if 
distributed in a connected - but secure - environ-
ment, such as an Intranet. This could host regularly 
updated technical databases, online courses that 
could be adapted easily to the latest technologies or 
a live discussion (or chat) with specialists who are 
often otherwise difficult to reach. In our e-Europe 
environment, all ministers and police agencies are 
gradually being equipped with such a network. In 
France for instance, the Gendarmerie Nationale will 
have deployed its Intranet in all its 3600 local units 
by 2003, and it is already available through over 
100 access points, which allow field trials to be 
scheduled very quickly. 
A secure environment can be set up on an 
Internet server, providing similar services to an in-
tranet (see Box 1). Interpol and ENFSI are moving in 
this direction as a means of providing training ma-
terial and technical databases to police and forensic 
laboratory specialists all over Europe and the world. 
All these new tools are urgently needed, and 
will help provide an efficient, inexpensive and ra-
pid solution to providing decentralized training. 
Crime prevention 
The responsibility of law enforcement goes 
beyond the needs of law enforcers themselves. The 
general public and the management of industry 
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must be informed in order to better prevent and 
report crime involving information technologies. 
Box 1. The Gendarmerie Nationale 
Intranet - France 
Like any other major institution in France, 
the Gendarmerie Nationale, the second-
largest national police force in France, 
with 96,000 people, is using a large secure 
communications system. In view of the new 
possibilities offered by Internet technologies, 
in 1998 the Gendarmerie decided to set up 
its own specific Intranet. 
This Intranet originally contained a series 
of web pages, a directory and a database of 
all legal texts in force (over 9000 documents 
relating to the operation of the Gendarmerie 
Nationale which had traditionally been 
stored on paper and were put on CD-ROMs 
in the 1990s). 
A number of other major applications, 
mainly in the form of centralized databases, 
have been identified and are currently 
being transferred on to the Intranet. Training 
is another application which is being develo-
ped. As a starting point, standard training 
documents are being converted into web 
documents, but more interactive features 
will eventually be developed, such as online 
classrooms. 
The advantages of the Intranet as a training 
tool include its cost effectiveness (less paper 
to be mailed all over the country), ease of 
upgrading and interactivity. 
As an open environment the Internet creates 
new dangers for children as well as for corporate 
networks. Parents, users, security specialists, and 
managers must be informed about the dangers, and 
they must also have the possibility of using properly 
configured software and hardware to protect them-
selves, their loved ones or their corporate assets. 
Informing the Internet-using public is an essen-
tial task. But the public must also be informed be-
fore going online, through more traditional mass 
media, in classrooms or when meeting law enfor-
cement bodies. In Canada, for instance, the govern-
ment has launched a specific programme called 
"Illegal and offensive content on the Internet" 
which consists of a 32 page booklet available both 
on and off the Internet. It also makes use of tele-
vision and newspaper advertising to inform Internet 
users of harmful or illegal content on the Internet, 
ways adults can protect themselves and their 
children, and also the channels through which to 
report abuses. 
Industry can also be a major partner in our fight 
against crime, or more simply in preventing the 
dangers brought by the use of information tech-
nologies. First, in developing and promoting the 
use of safer computer environments, e.g. better 
protected operating systems, secure electronic 
transactions; secondly, by implementing better IT 
security within their own organizations, including 
implementation of proper storage and manipula-
tion of potential evidence of attacks against their 
systems; and, thirdly, by assisting law enforcement 
bodies in the process of informing the public. The 
INHOPE initiative, (partly funded by the European 
Union) which aims to inform the public and 
encourage the reporting of illegal content, is worth 
repeating in other domains. This could possibly be 
extended to informing witnesses of a crime how 
best to preserve and present digital evidence. 
There is today an urgent need for the proper 
training of all actors - investigators, judges and ma-
nagers - who will be dealing with digital evidence 
in criminal investigations, especially those involved 
in the fight against cyber-crime. This training must 
reach all our partners equally and in a standard 
way to guarantee the protection of all citizens in 
today's networked and open environment. Industry 
and the public are our partners in the prevention of 
those crimes or specific dangers. To achieve our 
goals we need to use new technologies so as to 
operate in a way that is faster, less expensive and 
more effective. j B 
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Cyber-Security and the Future of Identity 
Marc Bogdanowicz and Laurent Beslay, IPTS 
issue: Everyday communication and participation In the public sphere Is tacitly under-
pinned by our shared understanding of the nature of identity, and our reliance on 
mechanisms of identification that enable us to trust information given by individuals we 
do not know personally. The processes central to the information society, such as 
digitization and remote interaction across communications networks, are placing exist-
ing models of Identity and mechanisms for identification under increasing strain. 
Relevance: Identification, authentication, privacy, and security of personal information 
are key issues for the information society. The misuse, either by individuals or organiza-
tions, of sensitive personal data that touches on our sense of identity has potentially far-
reaching social impacts. 
Challenged Identities 
ne can distinguish two views on identity: 
its socio-psychological conception, - i.e. 
an individual's shaping of himself, his sen-
se of being and belonging, etc. -, and what 
we can refer to as its procedural one, - i.e. the 
formalized means of identifying an individual for 
the purpose of interaction and transactions with 
others (see Box 1 ). 
Box 1. The socio-psychological 
and procedural concepts of identity 
From a socio-psychological point of 
view, identity is a dynamically changing 
configuration reflecting, and broadly shaped 
by, the history of interactions between an 
individual and his environment, and in 
particular "others". Socio-psychological 
identity goes hand-in-hand with an individual's 
physical characteristics (one person/one body) 
and a broad range of non-physical individual 
and relational aspects we associate with 
ourselves: describing it extensively is both 
a private and endless task if one wants to 
go deeply in ones' own description1. 
Identity is characterized by aspects such as2: 
• Permanency: It is evolving but constant 
in terms ottime, permanent despite all 
change in (its) history. 
• Unity: It is (perceived as) united in its 
diversity. Although diverse, various 
facets contribute to defining a single 
unique identity3. 
• Physical reality: It is associated with 
changing but again permanent "physical" 
characteristics, i.e. in the physical world 
we have one body for one identity. 
From a procedural point of view, identity 
is a collection of formalized characteristics, 
which enable identification and authentication 
necessary for social and economic relations, as 
well as dealings with the authorities. The usual 
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basic ingredients are things like a person's 
name, marital status, date of birth, height, 
colour of skin or eyes, number of children, 
nationality, educational and professional 
qualifications, etc. The choice of these 
characteristics may depend on the context, 
i.e. controlling authority, functional needs, etc. 
Interestingly, there is considerable interaction 
between both the procedural and socio-psycholo-
gical facets of identity. Our procedural identity 
follows us formally from birth to death, it presents 
us as a unique individual, i.e. as citizen on an 
electoral role, with a unique social security or ID 
card number, etc. Even if it acknowledges our 
various roles in social life, it relies strongly on our 
physical presence and representation, for instance 
through the photos on passports and ID cards. The 
weakening of these interrelations underlies many of 
the issues raised by the future of identity in a digi-
tized world (see Box 2). 
Box 2. Historical disruptions 
According to Nathalie Zemon4 Davis, the case 
of Martin Guerre story5 illustrates this concept. 
The story underlines the fact that when direct 
physical continuity is interrupted (the absence 
of Martin for 8 years) the relationship between 
the informational pattern identifying the 
individual and the physical entity so identified 
becomes problematic. Contemporary examples 
of historical disruptions concern cases of ID 
cards where the photograph of the owner 
could no longer be considered to be acceptably 
"representative", e.g. as a result of ageing. 
The crucial point here is that what was an 
exceptional situation in the time of Martin 
Guerre has become the standard in the 
Information Society. Indeed, the Information 
Society, which is based on intangible assets, 
exchange and relation, is no longer a face-to-
face culture. In this environment there is no 
direct physical continuity, and the historical 
unity of identity is lost. This therefore creates 
a need for a new model of identification to 
fill the gap of this disruptive situation. 
Our hypothesis is that both facets of identity, 
socio-psychological and procedural, are challen-
ged by new and future technologies in three ways: 
• Identity Crisis: Socio-psychological identity re-
sults from an on-going process of "construction 
through interaction". Consequently, some au-
thors claim that we are witnessing a progressive 
transformation of the boundary conditions of this 
construction process. In the emergent Information 
Society, new forms of communication and the 
emergence of new communities, sustaining in-
between identities, would challenge individual 
and communal6 identities. This would possibly 
lead to a so-called "societal identity crisis"7. 
• Digital Identities: The digitization of identity-
related characteristics is progressively changing 
our ways of identifying individuals through their 
-now digital- identities: the context has chan-
ged and so with it the characteristics. Mapping 
digitized identities has been generating its own 
set of issues for the past decade. 
• Virtual Identities: Networking puts the individual 
at the convergence point of an extended matrix 
of potential interactions. The dynamic process of 
identity-building, while taking place in a wider 
world of communication, and the constraints of 
a digitized environment offer opportunities for 
creating supplementary digital identities, -so-
called virtual identities - for reasons of security, 
profit, convenience or simply fun. Virtual and 
multiple identities do develop and, ultimately 
may feed back into the "physical" world, offer-
ing a mix of physical/virtual plural identities. 
Security is obviously at stake at both the indi-
vidual and collective level. Identification as the 
entry point to defining individual responsibility, and 
privacy as the fundamental basis of our social 
structures, are both directly challenged by current 
and emerging trends in technology. The two follow-
ing sections intend to give an insight in this evolu-
29 
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tion and to identify some challenges and areas of 
research resulting from the growing pervasiveness of 
Digital Identities and from the progressive emer­
gence of Virtual Identities. 
Issues raised by the emergence 
of Digital identities 
Traditional procedural identity refers to a closed 
set of attributes defined by the context of identi­
fication. It creates a basis for identity, carefully built 
on long­lasting historical and political develop­
ments strongly related to definitions of privacy and 
citizenship. It shifts ­"translates"­ identity towards a 
narrower and restricted set of characteristics which 
obey the necessities of functional contexts such as 
the economic (i.e.· commercial transactions), the 
judicial and social (e.g. paternity, family obliga­
tions, validation of legal documents, etc.) or the 
political spheres (i.e. citizenship). 
In turn, the digitization of identity, which is 
today indisputable and irreversible, comes initially 
from the growing amount of data accumulated by 
contemporary administrative practices, associated 
with the storage capacities and the processing 
power of ICTs8. 
Digital identity can be envisaged as comprising 
two aspects: 
• a digitized version of procedural identity. It 
offers a "second translation" ­in digitized from­
of existing data collected about the individual 
(National ID, Social security cards, etc.) 
• a pervasive means of direct association between 
data and individuals creating new "contextual 
models" of individuals through the collection, 
storage and analysis of digital data about them9. 
Digital Identity and authentication 
As proposed by Schneier10, one can consider 
that traditionally there were three sets of characte­
ristics by which people were procedurally identi­
fiable: 
• Something one is (often in a face­to­face con­
text): physical image, face, voice, etc. 
• Something one knows and uses actively to iden­
tify oneself: name, address, social security num­
ber, etc. 
• Something one owns and that represents an 
accepted representation of his identity: passport, 
token, PC card, device, etc. 
Digitization of identity offers the opportunity to 
extend the range of characteristics in each cate­
gory: biometrics, DNA, fingerprints, voiceprint, eye 
scans, passwords, PIN codes, smartcards, etc. The 
reliability of these new characteristics should be 
further checked in view of the proliferation of 
unregulated initiatives on the market. 
Beyond Schneier's three categories of charac­
teristics used for identification, networking and 
digitization offer the opportunity for using a fourth 
characteristic, namely "something one does". In­
deed, our online activities are watched and 
captured, stored and cross­analysed by the profita­
ble "profiling" business. Additionally, registration 
measures including passwords are often used to 
initiate and reinforce profiling by collecting data 
and attaching data, passwords and behaviours to a 
digital profile. Privacy is at stake and the process 
generates feed­back effects on emerging digital 
identities: the shapes of digital identity are built by 
the information system in which they take place11. 
Digital identities are either a second­hand trans­
lation of existing traditional procedural identities or 
a collection of elementary portions of either pre­
existing or new data about an individual. 
It may be that we are witnessing a splintering of 
procedural identity. Increasingly, identity is defi­
ned by means of a collection of digital fragments 
(social security numbers, electronic signatures, 
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and personal data). Depending on the situation 
(identification and authentication), systems will 
use only one portion of this collection although, as 
mentioned, identity is based on unity. Weakening 
the basic concept of identity raises some concern 
about the trustworthiness of authentication in digi-
tal environments. 
Identification and authentication 
Identification is "The process that enables 
recognition of a user described to an auto-
mated data processing system. This is 
generally by "the use of unique machine-
readable names"12. Authentication is 
"The act of verifying the claimed identity 
of an individual, station or originator"13, 
in simple terms, identification asks "who 
are you?" and authentication asks "Are 
you who you say you are?" 
Privacy issues 
Digitization offers a unique opportunity for rapi-
dly -albeit somewhat blindly- processing very 
large amounts of data. These data may be gathered 
over long periods of time and presented in a 
standardized digital format. Examples of the use of 
this type of data are already well known (Dou-
bleClick, Equifax,...). Regulatory initiatives like the 
EU Data Protection Directive14 are intended to 
ensure that proper use is made of these data. 
Recent controversial uses of the archives of on-
line forums have demonstrated the uncontrollable 
effects of long-term storage of individual data. 
Google, the biggest Internet search engine com-
pany recently bought another company, which had 
run a Usenet Discussion Service since 199515 (a 
database of thousands of discussion forums). After 
the conclusion of the financial transaction, the 
user's chat forum collection was copied and pasted 
into the database of the search engine company. 
Because these chat forums are still publicly acces-
sible, a candidate for a job, say, could potentially 
have to deal with cynical comments he may have 
made years ago. Digitization offers further oppor-
tunities for such long-term storage. The "right-to-
forget" is not as such part of any legislation16, and 
the right to erase data about oneself is strongly 
weakened by the impact of database networking. 
This right should imply that collected personal data 
is erased after it has been used for the purpose for 
which it was stored. 
Often looked upon with suspicion, anonymity is 
a basic feature of behaviour and a right in our 
societies, not for illegal purposes but in order to 
guarantee basic rights of privacy17. Storing and 
profiling people's behaviours on the net, or cross-
checking individual data with localization technol-
ogies18 are examples showing how anonymity is 
strongly endangered by the development of digital 
identities. 
Theft of identity 
Cyberspace creates opportunities for identity 
theft because digital records can be duplicated 
perfectly and leave no immediate evidence of 
crime19, thus multiplying an existing risk. In 1997, 
A.Cavoukian20, the Ontario privacy commissioner, 
defined identity theft as the acquisition of key 
pieces of someone's identifying information in 
order to impersonate them and to commit various 
crimes in that person's name. According to her, this 
area threatens to be the next growth industry in 
crime21. Recent hacking22 and/or theft of data 
among major profile or credit card companies are 
a clear warning of the weaknesses of the system. 
Some of the apparently most promising authen-
tication techniques may have dangerous conse-
quences. Biometrics23 (i.e. DNA key, eye or voice-
prints, etc.) is widely considered to be the most 
advanced and securest solution for identification or 
authentication because it uses characteristics that 
are intimately bound to a particular individual. 
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Nevertheless, these characteristics cannot be repla­
ced or modified, and if stolen there is no way of 
reversing the damage. 
Once authentication keys are stored in digital 
format on network­connected databases or are 
transmitted over the network they are prone to 
hacking or interception and misuse from virtually 
anywhere in the world. The use of digital identities 
worldwide means networks have to be looked 
upon as critical infrastructures, both for the well 
being of populations and for the sustainability of 
the system itself. Most advanced and networked 
countries are also countries that face the issue of 
critical infrastructures in areas such as energy, 
transport, financial services, administration, etc. 
The emergence of "Virtual identities" 
Virtual identities build upon the opportunity of 
creating a totally virtual world of individuals (and 
possibly environments) in a digitized world. Virtual 
identities were first developed, most visibly, in on­
line games such as MUD (Multi­user Dungeon or 
Multi­user Dimension). Since then, driven by va­
rious factors such as the explosive growth of social 
interaction over the network24, the increase in peo­
ple's mobility and the introduction of new means of 
communication, the environment has evolved and 
virtual identity has acquired a more serious 
purpose with its own potential rights and duties. 
Secondly, the multiplication of registration pro­
cesses on the net also encourages the trend. To 
avoid profiling, individuals opt for pseudonyms 
and develop virtual identities that are intended to 
have only the weakest links to real individuals. 
Additionally, several major companies have ente­
red the business of on­line registration and 
authentication, and aim to offer users fully integra­
ted virtual identities presented as digital passports 
to the cyberworld. Microsoft's Hailstorm and 
Novell's Digitalme are examples of controversial25 
digital identity management systems. Finally, 
technology foresight exercises offer visions of Ubi­
quitous computing and Ambient Intelligence26 
worlds that refer explicitly to a further development 
of virtual worlds, both as multiple virtual human 
identities as well as virtual machine identities. 
Forums, hacking activities, personal web sites 
that act as "virtual residences" (see Box 4) and pro­
grammable intelligent agents, ­mainly search en­
gines­ are other entry points for multiplying virtual 
identities and pseudonyms. 
■ 
. Virtual residences 
The digitization of the privacy component 
leads to a digital version of the private sphere. 
With the development of new technologies 
related to the domestic ambient intelligence 
(domestic networks, gateways, home servers, 
etc.) the boundaries of this domestic/private 
sphere have evolved considerably. Observers 
suggest that a persona I web site with family 
information and services could be considered 
in the future as a new private sphere, i.e. a 
virtual residence". 
Today, virtual identities can already be borrowed 
or sold on the web27. Such identities may be va­
luable because they have developed their own his­
tory curriculum, for instance, in game roles or in fo­
rums and discussion groups. They have already pro­
gressed to the use of virtual payment systems such as 
Beenz28 but could tomorrow be authorized to use 
credit cards. In this ex­nihilo world, production of 
multiple identities is the obvious next step, linking 
ubiquitously into multiple social activities. 
We see virtual identity as the next step in the 
evolution of identity, where virtual identity: 
• Is a procedural identity built mainly, if not ex­
clusively, as a digital trace 
• May be supported by some aspects of the phy­
sical world but stays largely independent of it 
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• May be created by software to offer persona-
lized services to customers 
• Offers the opportunity for multiple identities 
• Can interact strongly with the physical world. 
Identification, privacy and security 
of identity 
Many of the issues arising out of the digitiza-
tion of identities are relevant for Virtual identities. 
However, virtual identities extend this range of 
issues, offering some new potential challenges. 
Obviously, the identification process, whereby 
one specific individual is associated with a series 
of recognizable characteristics, is strongly cha-
llenged by the existence of virtual identities. Part 
of their purpose is precisely to avoid any possible 
correlation. Hacking activities have demons-
trated this to the extreme29. Identification in in-
teractions and transactions being a matter of 
identifying responsibility, the emergence of vir-
tual identities and its consequences need to be 
better understood. 
Virtual identities emerge apparently "out of 
nowhere" and can be pure inventions. They may 
also disappear equally rapidly and without trace. 
These are features which run counter to the "per-
manency" and "physical reality" criteria that are 
expected in any identification process correlating 
a physical individual to a set of digital data. Again, 
the longer-term consequences of this contradiction 
are far from explored. 
Virtual identities may be considered a new way 
of developing privacy-related tools. Hiding behind a 
pseudonym that would have access to the physical 
world, including the ability to enter into commercial 
transactions, is a way of counteracting governmental 
monitoring or companies' profiling and surveillance. 
This aspect necessarily is a concern for law enfor-
cement agencies when virtual identity feeds back 
into the real world. 
According to the EU Data Protection Directive, 
information is personal if it can be associated with 
an identifiable individual30. Virtual identity does not 
seem to offer that protection: this new way of 
shaping an identity has more or less no (legal) link 
with an identifiable "natural"31 individual. As a 
consequence, 'virtual individuals' could have no 
privacy rights. The concept of virtual identity could 
offer tomorrow a very attractive way of building up 
huge databases of unlimited detail within the legal 
framework32. 
Moreover, the ownership of virtual identities is 
also a thorny issue. Microsoft and Novell's initia-
tives on "Digital passports" have created a great 
deal of concern among commentators worried 
about the trustworthiness of such companies when 
compiling personal data on their customers. Asso-
ciating an individual with an IP address or a num-
ber for a lifetime, in the real or the cyberworld, 
necessitates some precautionary thinking. Further-
more, considering that virtual identities are, to 
some extent, pure creations, IPR issues about one's 
own personal data, real or invented, could well 
arise. Today, some MUDs are on sale, and for quite 
large sums of money. 
It may prove extremely difficult to establish 
evidence of the theft of a virtual identity. Indeed, it 
may be difficult to prove that it ever existed at all. 
As there is no correlation between an individual 
and a virtual identity, it will be difficult to identify 
the person who claims to have had it stolen from 
them and the damage that has been caused. Fur-
thermore, if it does prove possible to link a virtual 
identity to its original owner, any damage done to 
others using it could be made the responsibility of 
that initial owner. This threat becomes a major 
issue for law enforcement regarding the difficulty of 
collecting digital evidence of cyber-crimes. 
The modification of virtual identities in a 
database or at individual level could generate 
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much more confusion than current forms of hack­
ing. In the absence of reliable correlation between 
the characteristics of a virtual identity and that of 
a physical "model", hacking could present irre­
versible effects. 
Conclusion 
The digital world is progressively taking over 
some of our most important activities in relation to 
personal communication, commercial transactions, 
rights and duties. In these circumstances, security 
concerns and the concept of critical infrastructure 
rapidly come to the fore. Digital and virtual iden­
tities make us personally enter this digital world. 
Simultaneously, the correlation between the phy­
sical and the virtual world tends to weaken, if not 
disappear. Thus, permanency, unity and physical 
reality of identity seem less and less solid as 
reference points in a virtual world where tomorrow 
we may expect machines offering a virtual identity 
to chat with customers. 
Identity (and its essential authenticating role in 
most contexts) is an evolving concept in terms of the 
practices developing around digital and virtual iden­
tities. The phenomenon may be seen as a major 
opportunity when one thinks of the numerous appli­
cation domains of this evolution: customization 
practices, emergency services support, transport ma­
nagement, mobility, enhancement of human com­
munication, worldwide access to information, ser­
vices and products, reorganization of production 
processes, sustainability effects, etc. But one has to 
acknowledge the risks that exist as a consequence of 
the seriousness of the potential negative impacts and 
the growing likelihood of their occurrence. 
There is obviously a need for research and pro­
active thinking on these aspects. As we move into 
the Information Society we have to acknowledge 
that some of the possible consequences are still 
unknown or poorly defined. A better understanding 
of digital and virtual identities, and of their possible 
effects, is still needed. Λ 
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